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NOT WITH A BANG, BUT A WHIMPER: CONGRESS'S
PROPOSAL TO OVERTURN THE SUPREME
COURT'S LEEGIN DECISION WITH THE
DISCOUNT PRICING CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT OF 2009
PART I: INTRODUCTION
It is not often that the Supreme Court overturns a ninety-six
year old precedent, and thus the Court made big news in 2007
when it did just that in the case Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc.
v. PSKS, Inc.' The majority overturned Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co., 2 which held that agreements between a manu-
facturer and a distributor setting minimum resale prices for distrib-
utors are illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 The
antitrust world was abuzz, and many excitedly welcomed the end of
Dr. Miles and what was generally believed to be its antiquated eco-
nomic view of the world.4 Nevertheless, some feared the change,
accusing the Supreme Court of instituting a rule that could poten-
tially harm consumers and destroy the world of discount shopping
as we know it.6
1. 551 U.S. 877, 881-82 (2007). See, e.g., Joseph Pereira, Price-Fixing Makes
Comeback After Supreme Court Ruling, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2008, at Al (announcing
change in Supreme Court precedent that vertical minimum price fixing had be-
come legal practice under some circumstances).
2. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
3. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881-82 (overturning Dr. Miles decision and subjecting
vertical price fixing agreements to rule of reason analysis). It was clear, at least by
2007, that Dr. Miles made illegal only minimum RPM, not all vertical price-fixing
agreements.
4. See, e.g., Douglas R. Cole &J. Bruce McDonald, Dr. Miles Receives its Coup de
Grace, JONES DAY (July 2007) (praising new precedent set forth by Leegin); Thom
Lambert, Dr. Miles (1911 - 2007), TRUTH ON THE MARKET (June 29, 2007), http://
truthonthemarket.com/2007/06/29/dr-miles-1911-2007/ (lauding Leegin decision
and explaining economic justifications for Supreme Court ruling); Josh Wright,
Evaluating Leegin, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (June 30, 2007), http://truthonthemar-
ket.com/2007/06/30/evaluating-leegin/ (assessing Leegin's consistency with mod-
em antitrust policy and further supporting Supreme Court decision).
5. See, eg., S. 2261, 110th Cong. (as presented Oct. 30, 2007) (proposing to
reinstate per se ban on vertical price fixing agreements because of potential harm
to consumers); Pamela Jones Harbour, A Tale of Two Marks, and Other Antitrust
Concerns, 20 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 32 (2008) (expressing fears that allowing verti-
cal price fixing will hurt consumers); Mike Himowitz, Electronic Bargains of Today
will be Gone by This Time Next Year, BALT. SUN,July 5, 2007, at 7D (forecasting that all
electronics companies will institute vertical price agreements thus uniformly rais-
ing consumer prices). Some states have also placed a ban on vertical price fixing
agreements. See, e.g., Joseph Pereira, State Law Targets 'Minimum Pricing,', WALL ST.
(645)
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Mostly, it has been big business opposing the new rule, declar-
ing it harmful not only to consumers, but also to small mom-and-
pop establishments. 6 Predictably, the person most vocal about the
new standard is Herb Kohl, Senator of Wisconsin, and a founder of
Kohl's Department Stores, a discount retailing chain.7 Endorsed by
others, Senator Kohl has proposed a bill before the Senate; Con-
gressman Johnson of Georgia is to present the bill before the
House of Representatives." If passed into law, the Discount Pricing
Consumer Protection Act of 2009 will overturn the Leegin decision,
instating a blanket ban on vertical minimum pricing agreements
between manufacturers and resale dealers.9
Senator Kohl has tried to show Leegin's potential threat to con-
sumers by claiming a large number of manufacturers have been
"exploiting" the new rule and needlessly setting minimum retail
J. (Apr. 28, 2009) (reporting on Maryland's decision to ban minimum price fixing
agreements).
6. See eBay Voices Strong Support for the Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act',
EBAY MAIN STREET (July 16, 2009), http://www.ebaymainstreet.com/news-events/
cohen-urges-congress-support-hr3190 (stating eBay's support for bill proposing to
eliminate vertical minimum price fixing agreements); Heather M. Cooper & Jen-
nifer M. Driscoll-Chippendale, A Window into Washington: Proposed Legislation to Pro-
hibit Resale Price Maintenance Agreements, SHEPPARD MULLIN, RICHTER, AND HAMPTON
LLP: ANTITRUST LAW BLOG (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/
2010/04/articles/article/a-window-into-washington-proposed-legislation-to-pro-
hibit-resale-price-maintenance-agreements/ (listing supporters of bill, among
which is amazon.com). In a press release, Senator Kohl claimed that internet and
small businesses have complained of manufacturers instituting harmful minimum
price agreements. See Legislation is Response to Supreme Court's Decision to Overturn
Ban on Vertical Price Fixing, NEWSROOM SENATOR HERB KOHL (Mar. 18, 2010), http:/
/kohl.senate.gov/newsroom/pressrelease.cfm?customel dataPagelD1 464=3500
(advocating pending legislative ban on vertical minimum price fixing agreements)
[hereinafter Newsroom Senator Kohl]. Competing arguments state that not al-
lowing vertical price fixing agreements may actually harm small businesses which
would previously have been able to compete with larger price-only based competi-
tors by offering superior services as a compliment to certain products. See
Jonathan Moore, Looking Out for the Big Guys, AMERICAN SPECTATOR (Mar. 9, 2010,
6:07 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/2010/03/09/looking-out-for-the-big-
guys/print (arguing that eliminating vertical minimum price fixing agreements
could in fact benefit large corporations and not small businesses).
7. See Biography, SENATOR HERB KOHL: UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR WIscoN-
SIN, http://kohl.senate.gov/bio.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2011) ("Before coming to
the Senate, Kohl helped build his family-owned business, Kohl's grocery and de-
partment stores. He served as president from 1970 through the sale of the corpo-
ration in 1979.").
8. See S. 148, 111th Cong. (2009) (asking that Senate amend Sherman Act to
place ban on vertical minimum price fixing agreements); H.R. 3190, 111th Cong.
(2009) (proposing that House of Representatives vote to enact legislation that
would place ban on vertical minimum price fixing agreements).
9. See S. 148, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (pushing to overturn Supreme Court
decision in Leegin).
[Vol. 18: p. 645
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prices for their products.' 0 Manufacturers are generally silent
about the new rule in the press, probably due to the difficulty of
defending Leegin in one sound byte." Nevertheless, there have
been some small notes of excitement evidenced in certain indus-
tries, namely in the music industry.'2 Again, while this is not wide-
spread, at least one author, Ed Christman, has identified a couple
of notable advantages that minimum price fixing agreements be-
tween manufacturers and retailers could provide for both artists
and consumers alike.' 3
Since the arrival of digital downloading and electronic music
storage, compact disc sales have dropped significantly.' 4 This is
largely due to the heightened convenience and lower cost to con-
sumers that digital recordings offer.15 Consumers have benefitted
10. See Newsroom Senator Kohl, supra note 6 ("Since the Court's decision
three years ago, we have heard reports from all across the nation of manufacturers
demanding an end to discounting engaged in by all types of retailers, from small
mom-and-pop stores to giant Internet retailers.") (statement of Senator Kohl).
11. Understanding how higher retail prices can benefit consumers requires
the ability to follow an argument with more than one-step reasoning. See Jen
Haberkorn, Law Urged Against Price Floors, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2007) ("Compa-
nies aren't jumping at the opportunity [to fix prices].") (quotingJanet L. McDa-
vid, an antitrust attorney at Hogan & Harston in Washington, DC); Beth L.
Fancsali, Esq. & Paul Olszowka, Esq., How Wide Did the Supreme Court Open the Door to
Minimum Resale Pricing, 15 ANDREWs LITIG. REP. No. 6 (2007) (laying out law as
implied by Leegin decision and noting ambiguity as to what extent manufacturers
will employ vertical price fixing agreements with distributors and retailers).
12. See Ed Christman, Why Labels Should Set Minimum Price Restraints, BILL-
BOARD, Sept. 1, 2007, at 14 (hereinafter Christman I] (arguing that by setting mini-
mum price agreements with retailers, record labels could better promote small
musicians and smaller music businesses). But see Ed Christman, Why Labels Won't
Set Minimum-Pricing Restraints, BILLBOARD, Sept. 8, 2007, at 14 [hereinafter
Christman II] (explaining that setting minimum prices is still too risky for big busi-
nesses because of legal repercussions of anticompetitive behavior).
13. By setting minimum prices on music from smaller markets, record labels
could both help the market become established and give these smaller markets a
way to compete with the larger popular music markets. See Christman I, supra note
12, at 14 (discussing how businesses like Wal-Mart and Circuit City have been con-
trolling shape of new music production by making profits on individual songs/CDs
so low that only largest sellers can survive). A higher price on CDs or other non-
digital media in such markets could keep less profitable musicians afloat in a heav-
ily depressed price market. See Christman I, supra note 12, at 14 (asserting that
imposing minimum pricing on retailers would ensure that artists are represented
in retail market). Retailers would then also have more incentive to take on the less
profitable musicians and to promote those musicians to their customers. See id. at
14 (suggesting that if labels promise to set minimum prices, indie and small-chain
merchants would bear less risk in "breaking" or promoting emerging artists).
14. See David Goldman, Music's Lost Decade: Sales Cut in Half CNN MONEY.COM
(Feb. 3, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/02/news/companies/napster_
music-industry/ (documenting average of eight percent annual decrease in album
sales which is largely attributed to digital downloads).
15. See The NPD Group: Continued Sales Declines in 2008, but Music Listening and
Digital Downloads Increase, NPD GROUP (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.npd.com/
2011] 647
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from the lower prices of music and the lowered transaction costs.' 6
Some argue that given all the new digital options, consumers now
receive better services.' 7 But while the digital age has expanded the
music business in many ways, digitalization has also had a stifling
effect on certain specialized areas of the industry.' 8 Some poignant
examples of hard hit areas are the classical and jazz music
industries.' 9
press/releases/press_090317a.html (surveying NPD's annual market research on
music industry and noting that consumers cited immediate download and enjoy-
ment of media, and ability to select only the desired songs from an album as rea-
sons why digital downloads were superior to traditional music media formats).
16. See Zoonky Lee & Sanjay Gosain, A Longitudinal Price Comparison for
Music CDs in Electronic and Brick-and-Mortar Markets: Pricing Strategies in Emer-
gent Electro, J. Bus. STRATEGIES (Spring, 2002) at 1, available at http://www.entre-
preneur.com/tradejournals/article/ 87 20 6 220- .html (last visited Feb. 10, 2011)
(noting that digital music transfers lower consumer transaction costs).
17. Software features like iTunes's genius or websites like amazon.com allow
consumers to find a host of music options that conform to their individual tastes.
These sites take record of customers' prior music preferences and then try to
match those with new options. Such widespread individualized shopping would be
impossible to match by hiring music experts to interface one-on-one with consum-
ers. SeeJoelJohnson, A Look at iTunes "Genius" Music Recommendation Engine, BoING
BOING (Sept. 9, 2008, 4:04 PM), http://gadgets.boingboing.net/2008/09/09/a-
look-at-itunes-gen.html, (describing capabilities of iTunes's genius software fea-
ture). Another improved area of service is that of music sampling. Customers can
now sample most music instantaneously through iTunes, Amazon.com, YouTube,
Pandora, and musicians' own web pages. See Greg Sandoval, Music Publishers:
iTunes Not Paying Fair Share, CNET NEWS (Sept. 17, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/
8301-1023_3-10355448-93.html (criticizing record labels' recent attempts to place
royalty fees on sound sampling clips).
18. See Christopher Morris, Album Sales Drop, Digital Sales Soar: Strong Releases
Helped Slow Decline of New Album Sales, VARIETy (July 7, 2010) (noting declining CD
sales and increasing digital downloads across various sectors of music industry).
Allowing consumers to purchase individual songs rather than requiring them to
purchase an entire album's worth of music has decreased music industry revenues.
This has impacted smaller, un-cushioned music markets more profoundly than
mainstream music. See Christman I, supra note 12, at 14 (commenting on how
discounters like Wal-Mart and Circuit City control face of smaller music industries
now that digital sales are taking away from CD sales).
19. See Christman I, supra note 12, at 14 (discussing difficulties faced by jazz
and indie markets now that large discounting chains control CD sales). In indus-
tries with seriously declining live performance audiences, CD sales are ever more
important for keeping the sector alive. Although popularity in digital downloads
may be booming, the profit margins are so small that industries without live per-
formance or CD income have a hard time staying alive. See Album Sales Plunge,
Digital Downloads Up, MSNBC TODAY Music (Jan. 1, 2009) http://today.msnbc.
msn.com/id/28463074 (reporting that classical music saw largest shift from CD to
digital sales and commenting on how lower revenues are impacting labels' abilities
to invest in new artists). While independent or "indie" music may have once fallen
into the category of specialized music that required promotion by individual sell-
ers, the internet is now the ideal medium for such artists to promote their works.
See New Websites Help Indie Musicians Discover Audiences on the Internet, ARTICLE
SNACKS.COM (Feb. 22, 2011) http://www.articlesnacks.com/new-websites-help-in-
die-musicians-discover-audiences-on-the-internet (explaining how indie groups
[Vol. 18: p. 645
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Each of these genres tends to represent smaller music markets
that oftentimes appeal to a more knowledgeable subset of listen-
ers-ones who would prefer to purchase CDs because the medium
offers more complexity and depth of sound.20 Markets for these
types of music do exist, but CD sales in these markets have been
noticeably shrinking since digital music appeared in a way that
threatens the life of those industries. 21 While this may be due to
the natural evolution of consumer preference, some argue that be-
cause these types of music rely so heavily on a non-digital format,
large deep discounting chains have obliterated a small but other-
wise vibrant market.22 The result is less selection for consumers
within each of these small markets and fewer choices for consumers
overall because each industry can only support so many artists. 23
This makes for an extremely hard-to-enter market, ultimately limit-
ing consumer choice to the more popular types of music and po-
tentially leaving the market less opportunity to evolve in these
fringe categories. 24
One solution to these problems may be for manufacturers, or
in this case, small record labels supporting these less favored mar-
kets, to set minimum price agreements with retailers. 25 Doing so
now have greater access to audiences through internet blogs, networking sites and
special indie music websites).
20. SeeJohn Atkinson, MP3 vs. AAC vs. FLAC vs. CD, STEREOPHILE (Mar. 8,
2008) http://www.stereophile.com/features/308mp3cd/ (asserting that CDs and
other hard music media have superior sound quality to that of most mp3 options).
Note that digital music quality can equal that of CDs if downloaded in a "lossless"
format, available on iTunes. See id. (comparing lossless to "lossy" music formats).
21. See Album Sales Plunge, supra note 19 (implying shrinking CD sales in
smaller markets are having large impact on revenue despite increased digital
sales); Christman I, supra note 12, at 14 (commenting on serious effects decreased
CD sales have had on smaller music industries).
22. See Douglas Dempster, Wither the Audience for Classical Music?, 11 HARMONY
43, 44-45 (2000) (noting long lamented decline of classical music and offering
argument that industry is still alive and well, just in different context); Christman I,
supra note 12, at 14 (noting big chains like Wal-Mart, Circuit City, Best Buy and
Target now effectively control smaller music markets because of discount chains'
control of prices).
23. See ROBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A PoLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 61 (Free Press, 1993) (1978) (stating more choice benefits consumer
welfare).
24. See Christman II, supra note 12, at 14 (looking at indie music market and
noting smaller industries' difficulties in supporting wide array of emerging artists).
25. See id. (reasoning that minimum vertical price restraints as means to sup-
port smaller-market artists). But see Himowitz, supra note 5 at 7D (arguing that
record labels will exploit minimum price fixing agreements if given opportunity to
do so). Note that such a price fixing agreement would probably only be appropri-
ate when affixed to CD prices. There are many who argue that smaller music mar-
kets, such as classical music, have been able to reach more consumers thanks to
internet availability and low download prices. Also the 'services' would only truly
2011] 649
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could help record labels, small retailers, and potentially struggling
artists.2 6 Having a minimum price for certain artists could help re-
cord labels fund small artists-something hard for labels to do
when small and taking hits from large retailers and low-cost
download sellers.27 Further, this could encourage small retailers to
support new artists (and large retailers if they decide to take on an
artist) by allowing retailers a share in the profits for their promo-
tion of the new music. 28 Finally, minimum prices could open the
market for a larger number of artists, potentially helping the small-
est unit on the sale chain.2 9
The music industry is just one example of an area in which
vertical minimum price fixing could benefit consumers and per-
haps an entire industry.30 Unfortunately, at this point there are few
examples of instances where vertical minimum price fixing agree-
ments act to benefit the market because Leegin has been the rule for
such a short period of time.3 1 This comment revisits the Leegin de-
cision, which argued that vertical price minimums should not al-
ways be illegal but rather subject to review under the rule of
attach to a hard version of the media - higher sound quality of a CD or vinyl
recording and small dealer product promotion/customer matching. See, e.g., The
Cultural Liberation of the Digital Age, CHARGE SHOT (Aug. 6, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://
www.charge-shot.com/2010/08/cultural-liberation-of-digital-age.html (champion-
ing digital formats of classical music for their ability to penetrate larger market).
26. See Christman I, supra note 12, at 14 (presenting model that would band
together new artists and smaller music retailers with help of vertical price
minimums).
27. See id. (proposing a new model to support emerging artists); See Album
Sales Plunge, supra note 19 (observing how record labels have become more con-
servative in their support of new artists because of decreased revenue).
28. See Christman II, supra note 12, at 14 (setting out minimum price fixing
model for smaller areas of music industry).
29. See id. (giving proposal for retailer-artist relationship). A larger number
of artists in a particular market is better for consumers because it provides that
consumers with greater choices. See BORK, supra note 23, at 61 (commenting on
benefits of choice to consumer welfare).
30. See Barak Y. Orbach, Antitrust Vertical Myopia: The Allure of High Prices, 50
Aiz. L. REV. 261, 277-82 (2008) (presenting theory that consumers desire higher
prices for some goods because of additional benefits). The luxury goods market is
one in which both consumers and the product market benefit from higher fixed
prices. See id. (giving examples of luxury markets fueled by consumer desire for
status and services).
31. Because Leegin has been in place for less than three years, there is diffi-
culty charting the overall effect of minimum price fixing in various markets. This
is not to say such agreements are always beneficial. In fact, the Leegin majority
emphasized that such agreements could be abusive, which supports the view that
minimum price fixing agreements are not per se legal but are subject to the rule of
reason. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 892-94
(2007) (recognizing instances where minimum vertical price fixing can be
anticompetitive).
[Vol. 18: p. 645
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reason-being illegal only when they are on balance anticompeti-
tive.32 It examines the Supreme Court's reasoning, pays special at-
tention to the economic analysis behind the decision, argues that
allowing vertical price minimums is often the best construct for
consumers and the market and conclude that the Supreme Court's
decision in Leegin is correct.3 3
Part II gives an overview of the goals of the antitrust laws and a
brief history of the Court's approach to vertical price restraints. 34
Part III takes a closer look at the Leegin decision, paying particular
attention to the economic justifications behind the Court's analy-
sis. 35 Part IV introduces the Discount Pricing Consumer Protection
Act of 2009 and discusses its possible effect on vertical price re-
straints.3 6 Part V looks at the possible effects Leegin and the Dis-
count Consumer Protection Act of 2009 could have on the music
industry.37 The comment then concludes with the possible implica-
tions for future antitrust litigation should the proposed Act become
law and whether such an Act will work in favor of consumer
welfare.38
PART II: HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF VERTICAL PRICE RESTRAINTS
A. The Sherman Antitrust Act: A Brief History
The latter part of the nineteenth century was a time of previ-
ously unimagined progress and innovation, but along with all of its
positive changes, the Industrial Revolution also brought a "rampant
cartelization and monopolization of the American economy."39
The constructs of big business at the time allowed a small group of
powerful individuals and corporations to suddenly accumulate mas-
32. For further discussion of the Leegin decision, see infra notes 97-120 and
accompanying text.
33. For further analysis of the Supreme Court's rationale for and analysis of
the Leegin decision, see infra notes 121-67 and accompanying text.
34. For further background and judicial history of antitrust law, see infra
notes 37-96 and accompanying text.
35. For further discussion of economic justifications for Leegin decision, see
infra notes 97-167 and accompanying text.
36. For further description regarding the possible impact of the Discount
Pricing Consumer Act of 2009, see infra notes 168-204 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 214-230 and accompanying text (discussing possible effects
of Discount Pricing Consumer Act of 2009 on music industry).
38. See infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text (discussing implications of
enacting law).
39. THOMAS DILORENZO, How CAPITALISM SAVED AMERICA: THE UNTOLD His-
TORY OF OUR COUNTRY, FROM THE PILGRIMS TO THE PRESENT 135 (2004) (citation
omitted) (quoting Judge Richard Posner's comment on U.S. economic climate
prior to Sherman Act).
2011] 651
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sive fortunes and to create agreements that would help further that
wealth. 40 Fearful that this small group of individuals would stifle
competition, Congress passed the Sherman Act in July 1890, feder-
alizing the fight against cartels.4 '
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal " [elvery contract,
combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States."42 Read literally,
the Sherman Act makes any agreement to restrain trade illegal, but
the courts have substantially narrowed this broad language to mean
only any unreasonable restraint on trade.43 The courts have not
had to adhere to the plain meaning of the statute because the Su-
preme Court views the Sherman Act as a common law statute-one
that the courts can freely interpret to fit with the economic con-
cerns of the time. 44 As a result, Supreme Court jurisprudence on
40. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911) (noting
that even though there was common law tradition that precluded monopolistic
behavior, drastic change in economic landscape prompted Congress to enact fed-
eral statute against economic behavior threatening consumer welfare).
41. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966) (discuss-
ing rationale behind Sherman Act). A "cartel" is a group of producers of any prod-
uct that bands together with the intent to lower output and raise the price of that
product. By unilaterally lowering quantity and raising price, cartel members elimi-
nate inter-producer competition. Theoretically, reducing competition among pro-
ducers creates a disincentive to lower prices, harming consumers. See Ric-ARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 28-29 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining that competition in-
creases efficiency and thus lowers prices, benefitting consumers). Prior to the
Sherman Act, only the common law and state codifications limited monopolistic
behavior. Congress passing the Sherman Act not only shows profound national
concern about the concentration of corporate power, but also marks the begin-
ning of a new era where antitrust had become a national, not merely a local con-
cern. See DILORENZO, supra note 39, at 134 (noting prior to Sherman Act, states
enacted own statutes beginning in 1880s).
42. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
43. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007)
(quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)) ("[T]he Court has repeated
time and time again that § 1 'outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints.'"). Early an-
titrust jurisprudence reflects the courts' initial uncertainty on how to interpret sec-
tion 1-restricting all restraints on trade or only those that were unreasonable. See
United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327 (1897) (discussing ac-
tivity Congress intended to restrict when writing section 1 of Sherman Act).
44. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)
(stating Congress never intended for court to interpret Sherman Act literally); see
21 Cong. Rec. 245 (1890) (documenting statement of Sen. John Sherman); see
Robin Carey, The Sherman Act: What Did Congress Intend , 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 337,
344-45 (1989) (discussing members of Congress's intent when instituting Sherman
Antitrust Act); see Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885 (citation omitted) ("[T]he Court has
never 'taken a literal approach to [the Sherman Act's] language.'").
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the Sherman Act has transformed substantially over the years,
matching changes in economic conditions and understanding. 45
Although what constitutes an antitrust violation has changed
substantially over the years, the Court has remained faithful to the
principal goal of the Sherman Act-to protect consumer welfare by
promoting free market competition.46 At the Sherman Act's incep-
tion, the concern for consumer welfare could be translated into a
fear of large private economic power.47 While too much private
power may always be an overarching concern, in modern day anti-
trust law as influenced by the Chicago school, the overriding goal is
the protection of consumers in the form of lower prices and in-
creased output, regardless of which businesses (large or small) may
be benefitted incidentally.48 Under both models, consumer welfare
is key; in the modern era there is simply a new understanding of
what economic behavior benefits consumers-i.e. that sometimes
the interests of consumers align with those of big businesses and
sometimes with those of small businesses.4 9
Modern day economics focuses on efficiency because efficient
businesses are best able to lower production costs and increase the
overall value of goods and services, thus promoting material social
45. See Robert T. Miller, The End of the Road for Dr. Miles: Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., ENGAGE, Oct. 2007, at 40 (explaining difference in Su-
preme Court's antitrust analysis following 1977, when Court adopted Robert Bork
and other University of Chicago economists' modem economic approach to anti-
trust litigation).
46. See BoRK, supra note 23, at 17 (stating advancing consumer welfare was
the dominant goal in passing Sherman Act). Robert Bork's book presented a
scathing view of Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence prior to 1977, which at the
time stood contrary to modem economic principles. Following the publication of
Bork's book and publications of other Chicago School thinkers, the Supreme
Court changed its approach to antitrust analysis, systematically overturning deci-
sions inconsistent with modern economic understanding. See Miller, supra note
45, at 40 (noting impact of Bork's book on Supreme Court's approach to Sherman
Act jurisprudence).
47. See Carey, supra note 44, at 338-41 (describing social and political climate
at time of Sherman Act and citing examples of general fear of concentrated eco-
nomic power).
48. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (stating that
Sherman Act was designed to preserve "unfettered competition" so competitive
forces could allow for greatest material progress); BoRK, supra note 23, at 66 (argu-
ing consumer welfare was central consideration in instituting Sherman Act). Al-
though antitrust law does not fear big business, Congress often remains in fear. See
id. at 5 (pointing out Congress's mistaken blame of big business for array of eco-
nomic problems).
49. There has been a long-standing question over the definition of "consumer
welfare" and how best to protect it. See BoRK, supra note 23, at 50-70 (analyzing
and comparing meaning of consumer welfare from Sherman Act drafters' perspec-
tive to modem views of Act); but see Carey, supra note 44, at 337-38 (opposing
Bork's view of consumer welfare and alluding to conflict over term's definition).
2011] 653
9
Gillies: Not with a Bang, but a Whimper: Congress's Proposal to Overturn t
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
654 VILLANOVA SPoRTs & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
progress.50 Efficiency, though, is hard to measure, so the courts
determine antitrust violations by looking at the competitive effects
of a practice.5' The courts strike down anti-competitive activity-
that which unreasonably restrains trade-and seek to promote pro-
competitive activity.52 In a nutshell, anti-competitive activity is any
activity which could have the effect of raising prices and lowering
quantity in a particular market; pro-competitive activity is activity
that lowers prices and increases quantity in a particular market.53
To decide whether an activity is anti-competitive, courts typi-
cally perform a "rule of reason" analysis, initially placing the burden
to prove illegal activity on the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff is the
government or a private party.54 Under the rule of reason, "the
factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case" to determine
whether an activity is placing an unreasonable restraint on trade.5 5
The court considers factors that include "specific information
about the relevant business, its condition before and after the re-
straint was imposed, and the restraint's history, nature, and
effect."56
Although rule of reason analysis is the general analytical stan-
dard for determining an activity's competitive effects, in specific in-
stances, courts may declare an activity per se illegal.57 In general, the
50. See BORK supra note 23, at 7 (commenting on Supreme Court's prior igno-
rance regarding importance of efficient business practices).
51. See POSNER, supa note 41, at 29 (writing "efficiency is the ultimate goal of
antitrust, but competition, a mediate goal that will often be close enough to the
ultimate goal to allow the courts to look no further"); see also Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (noting that court
looks to whether restraint on trade has anti-competitive or pro-competitive effect).
52. See Cont'l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (noting
that restrictive practices are only illegal if they "impos[e] an unreasonable restraint
on competition."). Note that pro-competitive restraints on trade are perfectly le-
gal, the law only forbids anti-competitive restraints. See id. at 49-50 ("Per se rules of
illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly
anticompetitive.").
53. See Miller, supra note 45, at 42 (explaining anti-competitive behavior is
that which both raises prices and reduces quantity).
54. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (stating "this Court pre-
sumptively applies rule of reason analysis, under which antitrust plaintiffs must
demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and
anti-competitive before it will be found unlawful").
55. Cont'l T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 49.
56. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). This is not an all-inclusive
list. For example, the court also gives heavy weight to a company's market power.
See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (defining
rule of reason as "an inquiry into market power and market structure designed to
assess the combination's actual effect").
57. See Khan, 522 U.S. at 10 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958) (noting that restraints with "predictable and pernicious anticompetitive
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Supreme Court defines a practice as illegal per se when it "facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output . .. ."5 These are instances in
which the court has so much experience allowing the court to pre-
dict with certainty that a rule of reason analysis will show an an-
ticompetitive effect.59
Early antitrust jurisprudence is characterized by wide usage of
the per se label, mostly because the courts were still trying to get a
handle on what behavior the Sherman Act sought to prevent.60
When per se reasoning dominated, the Supreme Court began with
a per se ban on activity, perhaps because the Court discovered that
not everything made illegal by the per se rule was truly harmful to
competition, the court then allowed exceptions to that ban.61 After
effect" are per se illegal)); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-
43 (1982) (giving overview of rule of reason and per se analysis).
58. Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
59. See id. at 19 n.33 (explaining why in most cases court performs rule of
reason analysis). The Supreme Court allows for per se illegality in some cases be-
cause it recognizes the high costs and difficulties of proof in rule of reason cases.
See Nw. Wholesale Stationers Inc., v. Pacific Stationary & Printing, 472 U.S. 284,
289-91 (1985) (discussing requirements for establishing per se rule). The purpose
of having per se rules is to eliminate the high judicial and actual costs of going
through a rule of reason inquiry when such an approach is not appropriate under
the facts and circumstances of a particular case. See id. (explaining per se is meant
to conserve judicial resources in cases where court finds clear evidence of anticom-
petitive acts). Thus, in cases of substantial certainty, the Court yields to judicial
efficiency. See Maricopa Cnty., 457 U.S. at 343-44 (explaining judicial experience
can also allow for efficiencies in oftentimes expensive and complicated antitrust
litigation).
60. The courts struggled at first with whether to apply the Sherman Act to all
restraints on trade. See United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327
(1897) (noting Congressmen's varying perceptions of Sherman Act's goals). Fur-
ther, terms like "consumer welfare," which the Act purported to protect, were at
times unclear to thejustices. See Carey, supra note 44, at 342-58 (analyzing individ-
ual congressmen's intent in enacting Sherman Act). For examples of early cases
applying per se illegality to antitrust suits, See generally, Dr. Miles Med. Co., v. John
D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (holding vertical minimum price restraints
per se illegal); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that combina-
tion formed by newspaper with other company to coerce company into charging
only maximum retail price charged by newspaper was illegal under Sherman Act);
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (declaring unreasonable for
manufacturer to restrict and confine areas where dealers can trade).
61. See, e.g,. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 373 (modified by United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) eight years after Dr. Miles). Cases such as Cont'l T. V, Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Broad. Music Inc., 441 U.S. at 1 (1979);
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993); Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Verizon Comm'ns, Inc. v.
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); and Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007) all adopted economic views expressed in Robert Bork's "The Anti-
trust Paradox" and legalized many previously illegal practices. See generally BoRu,
supra note 23 (analyzing antitrust paradox).
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the Supreme Court's adoption of modern economic analysis begin-
ning in the 1970s, however, per se illegality became the exception
rather than the rule. 6 2 This changed approach is evident when we
look to the history of the Supreme Court's treatment of vertical
price restraints.63
B. An Overview of the Supreme Court's Approach to Vertical
Price Restraints: Gradually Limiting Dr. Miles
1. Dr. Miles: Instituting the per se standard for minimum price
restraints
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of vertical price
restraints when it decided the case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co. 6 4 The Dr. Miles Medical Company sold a medical
compound to wholesale druggists for resale to retailers in what is
believed to have been a competitive market for patent home reme-
dies. 65 To help maintain the premium price for its remedies, Dr.
Miles created a Retail Price Management ("RPM") Agreement for
both the 'jobbers" and wholesalers that sold its products. 66 John D.
Park & Sons was a wholesale druggist selling Dr. Miles's products,
but doing so under conditions that violated its agreement with Dr.
Miles-selling at a discount that was below the price specified in
the agreement.67 Dr. Miles sued to enforce its RPM agreement, but
was met with an unhappy result to its contract claim.68
62. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (stating Court "presump-
tively" applies rule of reason analysis).
63. See generally Alan H. Silberman, The Evolving Face of Vertical Restraints, CORP.
L. AND PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 531 (May-June 2009) (giving overview of
past and current law controlling vertical price restraints). To clarify, vertical price
restraints involve an agreement between a manufacturer and a retailer, thus a top
down or vertical agreement. See id. at 541 (explaining definition of vertical agree-
ments). An agreement between only manufacturers or only retailers is a horizon-
tal agreement and often indicates but does not confirm a Sherman Act violation.
See id. (explaining definition of horizontal agreements).
64. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
65. See Mark D. Bauer, Whither Dr. Miles?, 20 Lov. CONSUMER L. REv. 1, 3-4
(2007), available at http://works.bepress.com/mark bauer/2/ (illustrating histori-
cal and economic realities at time of Dr. Miles decision).
66. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 376 (laying out Dr. Miles's business practices and
reasons for opposition's suit). The Court noted that Dr. Miles argued fixed higher
prices were what ensured retail druggists would commend Dr. Miles's products
and allowed the retailers to make a profit on the product. See id. (commenting on
parties' rationales for actions in question).
67. See id. at 379 (stating Dr. Miles charged Park with "cutting prices" after
signing lengthy contract agreeing to sell Dr. Miles's products at set price).
68. See id. at 376-78 (laying out entire text of contract between parties).
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In particular, instead of resolving the contract issue, the Su-
preme Court ruled for John D. Park & Sons on an antitrust theory,
holding that the contract was unenforceable because it violated sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. 69 Since the Sherman Act was still fairly
new and the Court had little precedent to resolve the case, the
Court referenced common law antitrust doctrines.70 The Court
held that "agreements or combinations between dealers, having for
their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of
prices, are injurious to the public interest and void."7 1 Later deci-
sions interpreted this as a unilateral ban on minimum vertical price
fixing agreements and RPM agreements. 72
2. Colgate: Modifying Dr. Miles
Only seven years after the Dr. Miles decision, the Supreme
Court began to modify its per se approach to RPM agreements. 7 3 In
United States v. Colgate & Co.,74 the government accused Colgate of
vertical price fixing when the company refused to sell its product to
any retailer that failed to follow the company's established prices.7 5
The Court held that a manufacturer retains the right to decline to
deal with retailers that do not adhere to its sales conditions.76 To
69. See id. at 408 (holding agreements between dealers to fix prices was
against public interest and thus illegal).
70. See id. at 404 (declaring that by setting minimum prices, Dr. Miles had
placed "restraint on alienation" of property which was prohibited by common law
and under Sherman Act). The Court's language comes from an antiquated opin-
ion written by Lord Coke in Darcy v. Allien, which is one of the early British com-
mon law cases striking down monopoly behavior. See Darcy v. Allien, [1601] 77
Eng. Rep. 1260 (KB.). Robert Bork and other modern economists later mocked
this language because the Dr. Miles Court took it out of context. See Miller, supra
note 45, at 42 (commenting on reactions to alienation doctrine and noting that
while concept does hold some economic merit, there is not enough weight to
merit declaring per se rule against vertical price restraints).
71. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408.
72. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881
(2007) (commenting "[i]n [Dr. Miles] the Court established the rule that it is per
se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act ... for a manufacturer to agree with its
distributor to set the minimum price the distributor can charge for the manufac-
turer's goods.").
73. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306-07 (1918) (holding
only agreements to fix minimum resale prices were illegal per se).
74. 250 U.S. 300 (1918)
75. See id. at 303 (stating how Colgate sent documents to its retailers urging
them to adhere to minimum prices and threatening to cut off any retailer that did
not adhere to those minimums). In this case there was no formal contract or
agreement; however, the company was essentially setting minimum prices by
threat. See id. (noting company's black list for non-complying retailers).
76. See id. at 305 (explaining that individual's right to dispose of property as
person wishes and thus refusing to sell to company that does not meet manufac-
turer requirements is not illegal action under Sherman Act).
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support its decision, the Court reasoned that, absent any actual
agreement between the parties, there could be no violation of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act (which makes illegal only a "contract,
combination . .. or conspiracy") . Thus, so long as a manufacturer
did not enter into any RPM agreements, but merely unilaterally re-
fused to deal with distributors who did not adhere to its policies,
manufacturers could obtain almost the same results without violat-
ing the law.78
3. The Court's Approach to Vertical Non-Price Restraints
The Supreme Court did not revisit vertical restraints again for
over fifty years, addressing them in White Motor Company v. United
States.7 9 In White Motor Co., the United States accused White Motor
Company of violating the Sherman Act by granting its dealers ex-
clusive sales territories and limiting the clients to whom the dealers
could sell.80 While scrutinizing the vertical territorial limitations
used by White Motor Company, the Court emphasized that it was
unclear whether such behavior was indeed in restraint of trade, stat-
ing that more concrete evidence was needed to determine if such a
practice had a "pernicious effect on competition" and was devoid of
any "redeeming virtue."81 The Court did not venture to say that
vertical non-price restraints were always legal, but noted an unwill-
ingness to extend the Dr. Miles per se illegal ruling without evidence
77. Id. at 307.
[T]he act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manu-
facturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal . . . he may
announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to
sell.
Id. The Sherman Act requires that there be (1) an agreement and (2) that the
agreement restrain trade in order for an individual to engage in an antitrust viola-
tion. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) ("Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce . . . is . . . illegal.")
78. See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307 (stating conclusion of case). Later, critics
noted that, although a manufacturer could technically set a minimum price on
products by illicit agreement, doing so was extremely difficult to apply and thus of
little use in business. See Brief of PING, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner at 9-15, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877
(2007) (No. 06-480) (describing complicated procedure PING needed to employ
to utilize freedoms outlined in Colgate).
79. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
80. See id. at 255-57 (noting that retailers signed agreements to only sell within
certain territory and not to sell to any state or federal government department
unless company specifically gave permission in writing).
81. See id. at 263 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958)) (noting lack of evidence that company had engaged in any acts that
dampered competition).
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of any actual or potential negative impact on competition.82 Thus,
in this case, the court applied the rule of reason to vertical re-
straints-an act not often extended to other per se illegal acts-illus-
trating the Court at least recognized that vertical restraints could
have pro-competitive effects.83
Three years later the Supreme Court brushed aside its reason-
ing in White Motor Co., and instead of looking to possible pro-com-
petitive justifications, the Court once again applied a per se rule in a
vertical non-price restriction case, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, &
Co.8 4 The Court did not, however, overrule White Motor Co., making
the argument that antitrust rules apply differently to struggling
businesses acting to keep a foothold in the market.85 Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., a bicycle manufacturer whose share of the United
States bicycle market was a mere 12.8%, placed vertical non-price
restrictions on the wholesalers to which it sold its bicycles.86 Impor-
tantly, the Court paid no heed to any of the economic effects of the
company's acts and instead focused entirely on principles of aliena-
tion and title.87
The per se ban on vertical non-price restrictions lasted until
1977 but was the first per se ruling the Supreme Court overturned in
the Court's new economic era.8 8 Continental T. V Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia Inc.8 9 overturned Schwinn, calling the Dr. Miles Court's reading
of the Sherman Act into question for the first time through the
logic of its decision.90 The Court held that all vertical non-price
82. See id. (emphasizing that in deciding summary judgment, court could not
with certainty rule on whether company's actions indicated any restraint of trade
when effects of company's actions were uncertain).
83. See id. at 261 (citing Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918)) (discussing factors court should consider when performing rule of reason
analysis).
84. 388 U.S. 365, 381-82 (1967) (holding vertical non-price restraints were
illegal per se under Dr. Miles and Sherman Act).
85. See id. at 374 (suggesting that new or failing firms could be privy to enact-
ing otherwise unreasonable restraints).
86. See id. at 368 (explaining market shares of various U.S. bicycle companies
and noting Schwinn's distribution practices and requirements on wholesalers).
87. See id. at 377-79 (noting that manufacturer may not retain control of its
products once those products have passed on to retailer and disregarding actual
effects of manufacturer's activities on competition).
88. See Miller, supra note 45, at 45 (recognizing GTE Sylvania was first Su-
preme Court decision to attack per se standard set against vertical price restraints).
89. 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
90. See id. (overturning Schwinn by holding vertical non-price restraints should
not be subject to per se ruling and instead court should apply rule of reason analysis
to such cases). GTE Sylvania Inc. was a television manufacturer that originally sold
only to a large group of retailers. See id. at 38 ("[L]ike most other television manu-
facturers, Sylvania sold its televisions to independent or company-owned distribu-
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restraints were to be governed under a rule of reason analysis and
that alienation and title were no longer appropriate elements to
consider when determining whether a per se rule should apply.91
This rationale stemmed from the Court's discovery that vertical
non-price restraints often create efficiencies, which are pro-compet-
itive.92 The arguments and examples set forth in GTE Sylvania,
while not explicitly counter to Dr. Miles's reasoning, effectively un-
dermined the holding in that case as many of the Court's justifica-
tions for why vertical non-price restrictions were pro-competitive
also illustrate why minimum RPM could be pro-competitive.93
tors who in turn resold to a large and diverse group of retailers."). After losing
money with this marketing strategy, Sylvania began to sell directly to a small and
select group of franchised retailers. See id. ("Prompted by a decline in its market
share .... Sylvania phased out is wholesale distributors and began to sell its televi-
sions directly to a smaller and more select group of franchised retailers."). The
company's plan was to create a smaller group of aggressive retailers more dedi-
cated to the brand. See id. (acknowledging that purpose of strategy was to attract
more aggressive and competent retailers that company believed necessary to im-
prove its marketing position). Sylvania thus limited the number of franchises
within particular geographic areas and required that franchisees only sell within
their designated territory. See id. ("Sylvania limited the number of franchises
granted for any given area and required each franchisee to sell his Sylvania prod-
ucts only from the location or locations at which he was franchised."). Continental
was a very successful Sylvania franchisee. See id. at 39 (noting Continental was one
of most successful Sylvania franchisees). When Sylvania allowed another fran-
chisee to sell its products in Continental's territory, Continental and Sylvania came
to heads, resulting in Continental's eventual dismissal from the franchise program.
See id. at 39-40 ("Continental protested that the location of the new franchise vio-
lated Sylvania's marketing policy," and "Sylvania terminated Continental's
franchises."). Continental followed by suing Sylvania under an antitrust theory.
See id. ("Most important for our purposes was the claim that Sylvania had violated
§ 1 of the Sherman Act by entering into and enforcing franchise agreements that
prohibited the sale of Sylvania products other than from specified locations.").
91. See id. at 54 n.21 (noting critics' negative comments on Court's use of
alienation principle, calling it a "misreading of legal history and a perversion of
antitrust analysis" (citing Milton Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review, 53
VA. L. REV. 1667, 1684-86 (1967)).
92. See id. at 55-57 (citing both Posner and Bork explaining market efficien-
cies and how per se rule against vertical non-price restraints harms competition).
The Court gave the example of vertical non-price restraints encouraging new or
established manufacturers to enter new markets by allowing manufacturers to cre-
ate special incentives for "competent and aggressive retailers." See id. at 55 (giving
examples of cases where vertical non-price restraints could create efficiencies and
benefit consumers).
93. See id. (noting incentives non-price restrictions can create for retailers to
provide better services to consumers such as built-in repair costs and better point
of sale services).
[Vol. 18: p. 645
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol18/iss2/9
NOT WITH A BANG, BUT A WHIMPER
4. The Modern Economic Era: Further Modifications to Vertical Price
Analysis
After striking down the per se rule against vertical non-price re-
straints in Continental T V Inc., the Supreme Court decided two
other cases that further moved in the direction of overturning the
per se rule banning vertical price restraints. 94 The first case was Mon-
santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,5 in which the Court managed to
blur the line between vertical price and non-price restraints by not-
ing that often the two practices had similar economic effects.96 In
its subsequent case, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp.,9 7 the Court noted the importance of interbrand competi-
tion.98 Because vertical price restraints have a significant negative
94. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 766 (1984)
(holding heightened standard of proof in vertical price fixing cases and that
whether conspiracy was in place is jury question); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988) (formalizing that vertical trade restraints
are not per se illegal under Sherman Act unless restraints includes agreement on
price or price levels).
95. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
96. See id. at 761-62 (noting practical difficulty in distinguishing between ef-
fects of price-based and non-price based vertical restraints). In Monsanto Co.,
Spray-Rite was a discounting wholesale distributor of agricultural chemicals; Mon-
santo Co. was an agricultural chemical manufacturer with a relatively small share
of the market. See id. at 756 (stating that Spray-Rite was "engaged in the wholesale
distribution of agricultural chemicals" and that "Spray-Rite was a discount opera-
tion, buying in large quantities and selling at a low margin;" explaining that Mon-
santo manufactures chemical products, including agricultural herbicides, and
controlled 15% percent of corn herbicide market and 3% of soybean herbicide
market compared with competitors, one which owned 70% of corn herbicide mar-
ket and two others who owned 30% and 40%, respectively, of soybean herbicide
market). After some time working together, Monsanto announced a change in its
marketing practices, requiring certain criteria for its retail dealers. See id. at 756-57
("Monsanto announced that it would . . . renew distributorships according to sev-
eral new criteria."). After instituting the policy, Monsanto declined to renew its
contract with Spray-Rite. See id. at 757 ("Monsanto declined to renew Spray-Rite's
distributorship."). Monsanto's products made up nearly sixteen percent of Spray-
Rite's sales distribution; thus Spray-Rite was displeased when a year later, Monsanto
came out with a new product significantly boosting its share of the agricultural
chemical market. See id. ("Ninety percent of Spray-Rite's sales volume was devoted
to herbicide sales, and 16% of its sales were of Monsanto products."). Spray-Rite
sued, claiming Monsanto had conspired to fix its retail prices. See id. (summarizing
Spray-Rite's allegations under Sherman Act).
97. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
98. See id. at 725-26 (discussing relationship between interbrand and in-
trabrand competition in market and values of each). Business Electronics Corpo-
ration was the exclusive retailer in Houston, Texas for Sharp Electronic's
electronic calculators. See id. at 721 ("In 1968, petitioner became the exclusive
retailer in the Houston, Texas, area of electronic calculators manufactured by ...
Sharp Electronics Corporation."). After four years of being the exclusive retailer,
Business Electronics began to sell to another retailer in the area. See id. ("In 1972,
respondent appointed Gilbert Hartwell as a second retailer in the Houston area.").
Sharp published a list of suggested retail prices, but did not force either dealer to
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impact on intrabrand competition, allowing a force on the market
to limit that power could positively affect interbrand competition,
which is pro-competitive. 99
Finally, the Supreme Court came down with one more decision
prior to overruling Dr. Miles. 00 In State Oil Co. v. Khan,101 the Court
held that setting vertical price ceilings or maximum prices between
manufacturers and retailers was no longer a per se illegal act and
would instead be evaluated under the rule of reason.102 The deci-
apply them. See id. (" [Sharp] published a list of suggested minimum retail prices,
but its written dealership agreements . . . did not obligate either to observe them,
or to charge any other specific price."). The new retailer, Hartwell, provided supe-
rior services to Business Electronics, and thus often charged the suggested retail
price to cover the cost of providing those services. See id. (showing that Hartwell's
prices were higher than Business Electronics). On a number of occasions, Hart-
well complained to Sharp that Business Electronics was undercutting its prices and
offering no customer services. See id. ("Hartwell complained to [Sharp] on a num-
ber of occasions about petitioner's prices."). Hartwell threatened to end its con-
tract with Sharp if Sharp did not end its relationship with Business Electronics. See
id. ("Hartwell gave [Sharp] the ultimatum that Hartwell would terminate his deal-
ership unless [Sharp] ended its relationship with [Business Electronics]."). When
Sharp ended its agreement with Business Electronics, the retailer sued under § 1
of the Sherman Act. See id. (mentioning that Hartwell alleged that Sharp and Busi-
ness Electronics engaged in conspiracy in violation of Sherman Act).
99. See id. (noting that per se illegality of vertical restraints creates incentives
for manufacturers to act in ways that could stifle interbrand competition). But see
Orbach, supra note 30, at 261, 274 (asserting that resale price minimums do not
eliminate intrabrand competition; "rather, it substitutes intrabrand price competi-
tion with intrabrand non-price competition" (citation omitted)).
100. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (holding vertical maximum
price restrictions are not per se illegal under Sherman Act and should be examined
under rule of reason analysis). Khan agreed to lease and operate a gas station
owned by State Oil. See id. at 7-8 ("Khan and his corporation, entered into an
agreement with . . . State Oil Company, to lease and operate a gas station and
convenience store owned by State Oil."). The agreement stipulated that Khan
would get the gas station's gasoline from State Oil at a price equal to a suggested
retail price, set by State Oil. See id. at 8 ("The agreement provided that respon-
dents would obtain the station's gasoline supply from State Oil at a price equal to a
suggested retail price set by State Oil, less a margin of 3.25 cents per gallon.").
Khan had the option of charging consumers any price it chose, but any amount
above the suggested retail price was to be rebated to State Oil. See id. ("Under the
agreement, respondents could charge any amount for gasoline sold to the station's
customers, but if the price charged was higher than State Oil's suggested retail
price, the excess was to be rebated to State Oil."). After falling behind in its lease,
State Oil began eviction proceedings against Khan. See id. (explaining that after
Khan fell behind on lease payments, "State Oil then gave notice of its intent to
terminate the agreement and commenced a state court proceeding to evict re-
spondent."). Khan sued for illegal price fixing. See id. (noting that Khan sued
under Sherman Act).
101. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
102. See id. at 22 (declaring vertical maximum price restrictions are subject to
rule of reason analysis). This case overruled Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968), which held that vertical maximum price restraints are per se illegal under
Sherman Act. See id. (stating that it was overruling Albrecht).
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sion met little public resistance because consumers welcomed the
idea of limiting how much they pay for a product. 0 3 This rationale
effectively equated manufacturers with consumer market goals and
set the stage for striking the final per se rule on vertical price re-
straints: minimum price agreements. 0 4
PART III: UNDERSTANDING LEEGIN: THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Factual Overview
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. ("Leegin") manufac-
tured a high-end line of leather fashion accessories under the name
Brighton Products. 05 Leegin sold the Brighton goods to over
5,000 mostly-independent, small boutique retailers. 106 Leegin
claimed that such retailers were selected because those locations
had superior customer relations.107 Given that Leegin sold an up-
scale product, Leegin wished to provide its consumers with a
heightened level of service and also wanted retailers to represent its
products in a favorable light.'08
To ensure its product image was not cheapened, Leegin not
only carefully selected retail locations, but also laid out certain re-
quirements for its selected retailers to follow.109 Namely, Leggin
barred the retailers from selling its products below established
103. See id. at 17-19 (noting various concerns presented to discourage Court
from overturning per se illegality of maximum vertical price restraints). There was
some argument that maximum pricing could be used to mask minimum pricing.
See id. (stating concerns of pricing).
104. See id. at 17 (mentioning poor business judgment for manufacturers to
work with retailers as manufacturer interest lies more with that of consumer).
105. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882
(2007) (setting out facts of case).
106. See id. (describing Leegin's sales practices).
107. See id. at 883 ("We, at Leegin, . . . [sell at] specialty stores . . . that can
offer the customer great quality merchandise, superb service, and support the
Brighton product 365 days a year on a consistent basis.") .
108. See id. at 882 (stating company wished to give customers different experi-
ence than that available in large retail establishments). The argument for mini-
mum price requirements based upon a manufacturer's desire to push or keep its
product in the luxury goods market has been little explored. See Orbach, supra
note 30, at 261, 279 n.19 (noting that other than article from 1916 and student law
review note in 1995, scholars and courts have paid little attention to merits of
higher pricing for luxury goods). For a more in-depth analysis of how product
image affects consumption and benefits consumers, see Barak Y. Orbach, The Image
Theory: RPM and the Allure of High Pices, ANTITRUST BULL.,1, 6 (2010) (putting forth
theory that resale price maintenance was practice created to maintain brand
image).
109. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 883 (outlining reasons for Leegin instituting re-
tailer requirements).
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prices."i 0 Leegin adopted this practice in part so retailers would
have enough of a pay margin to provide superior customer ser-
vice."' Leegin also feared, however, that discounting its luxury
brand could harm the brand's name and reputation." 2
PSKS, Inc. ("PSKS") operated a small retailer, Kay's Kloset,
which was certified to sell Leegin's Brighton line." 3 A year after
Leegin instituted its pricing policy, Leegin began its "Heart Store
Program."11 4 Retailers that participated in the program pledged to
adhere to Leegin's suggested prices." 5 Kay's Kloset became a Heart
Store, but after a visiting Leegin employee found the store unattrac-
tive, Leegin and Kay's Kloset agreed Kay's would not retain that
status past 1998.116
Leegin's Brighton line was Kay's Kloset's most important
brand, accounting for forty to sixty percent of the retailer's prof-
its.117 Even after Kay's lost its status as a Heart Store, its Brighton
sales continued to increase." 8 Then in 2002, Leegin discovered
Kay's was discounting Brighton Products by twenty percent." 9
110. See id. (setting out Leegin price minimum program). The policy did,
however, allow an exception for "products not selling well that the retailer did not
plan on reordering." Id.
111. See id. (explaining benefits of price floor).
112. See id. (giving support for minimum price requirement). Setting prices
too low on certain products can have an adverse effect on sales. For further infor-
mation and economic support of this practice, see Orbach, supra note 30, at 10 -12
(providing information on history of economic theory behind why consumers in
some cases prefer to pay higher prices for goods they could purchase at lower
price).
113. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882-83 (introducing plaintiff).
114. See id. at 883-84 (explaining Leegin's Heart Store marketing scheme).
Leegin offered retailers incentives to become "Heart Stores" and in exchange for
retailers agreement not to charge below minimum set prices for Leegin's products.
See id. (illustrating Leegin's incentive plan).
115. See id. (laying out rules for Heart Store participation). Because Leegin
and the retailers actually agreed to a price minimum, the act counted as a per se
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, but that earlier on, when Leegin simply
refused to deal with retailers that did not adhere to certain pricing policies (poli-
cies not officially agreed upon), its acts fell within those permitted under the Col-
gate doctrine. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 305 (holding
manufacturer's refusal to deal with retailers that do not adhere with selling re-
quirements is not per se illegal under Sherman Act).
116. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 884 (narrating beginnings of conflict between par-
ties). Leegin began its Heart Store program in 1998, meaning Kay's Kloset could
not have been a participant for more than a year. See id. (setting out timeline for
pricing policy).
117. See id. at 883 (showing success of Brighton line and line's importance to
Kay's Kloset).
118. See id. at 884 (indicating alternative draw for Brighton customers beyond
store image).
119. See id. (outlining negative history between Leegin and Kay's).
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Kay's Kloset claimed it instituted these discounts to compete with
nearby retailers who were also undercutting Leegin's price floor.120
Leegin asked that Kay's cease selling Brighton Products at a dis-
count.121 When Kay's refused, Leegin stopped selling its products
to the retailer.' 22 The loss of revenue from its Brighton sales
greatly hurt Kay's, which prompted PSKS to sue on the retailer's
behalf.123
B. Procedural Posture Prior to Reaching the Supreme Court
PSKS sued Leegin in the district court, claiming that Leegin
had engaged in price fixing, an act that was per se illegal under Dr.
Miles.'24 The jury ruled for PSKS in the matter, causing Leegin to
appeal the trial court's decision in the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.12 5 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, stating that although
some types of vertical price-fixing agreements called for rule of rea-
son analysis, the Supreme Court had never applied rule of reason
to vertical minimum price-fixing agreements and thus was bound to
apply the per se rule.126 Further, the Dr. Miles precedent had stood
for seventy-three years at that point and there was no indication
from Congress that anything but a per se rule should apply to verti-
cal minimum RPM agreements. 127 After the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the trial court decision, Leegin appealed to the Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari on the question of "whether vertical mini-
mum resale price maintenance agreements should continue to be
treated as per se unlawful." 28
120. See id. (giving Kay's justifications for ignoring price floor).
121. See id. (showing reason for dispute).
122. See id. (showing Leegin's actions).
123. See id. (explaining grounds for lawsuit).
124. See PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 2004 WL
5254322 (E.D. Tex. Aug 17, 2004) (holding Leegin engaged in illegal vertical price
fixing). See Dr. Miles Med. Co., v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 220 U.S. 373, 373
(1911) (setting forth prior Supreme Court precedent on vertical price fixing).
125. See PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 171 Fed. Appx.
464, 2006-1 Trade Cases P 75, 166 (5th Cir. Mar 20, 2006) (holding district court
did not abuse discretion in excluding testimony from Leegin's economic expert).
126. See id. at 466 (stating that cases allowing for exceptions to Dr. Miles did
not create exemption for vertical minimum price-fixing agreements to per se rule
and that court was thus still bound by per se precedent).
127. See id. at 467 (noting Congress never enacted legislation to counter per se
standard set forth in Dr. Miles).
128. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885
(2007).
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C. The Majority's Analysis
The Court began its analysis with a summary of the current
legal position on per se illegality as pertains to section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.129 In its introduction, the Court emphasized that it has
never "taken a literal approach" to the Sherman Act's language on
contracts in restraint of trade.o30 The Court interprets section 1's
language to bar only unreasonable restraints on trade, not all re-
straints.13' This interpretation speaks to the "rule of reason," the
Supreme Court's preferred analysis in trade restraint cases under
the Sherman Act.132 This system of analysis requires that the
factfinder weigh all circumstances of a case when deciding whether
a particular practice is anti-competitive. 33 The Court noted that it
takes certain factors into account when performing this balancing
test, including "specific information about the relevant business
[and] the restraint's history, nature, and effect," as well as the busi-
ness in question's market power.134 Summing up its policies, the
Court focused on whether a practice is anti-competitive and thus
129. See id. at 885 (explaining Court's summary as to Sherman Act).
130. Id. "While § 1 could be interpreted to proscribe all contracts ... the
Court has never 'taken a literal approach to [its] language."' Id.
131. See id. (noting "[T]he Court has repeated time and again that § 1 'out-
law[s] only unreasonable restraints.'").
132. See id. (expressing that "[t]he rule of reason is the accepted standard for
testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation of§ 1.") (referring to Texaco
Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006)).
133. See id. at 885 (describing that "[u]nder this rule, the factfinder weighs all
of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.") (quoting Con-
tinental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc,. 433 U.S. 36,49 (1977)). When applying
rule of reason analysis, the initial burden is on the plaintiff to prove an anticompe-
titive effect. See Leegin at 885-86 (discussing process of rule of reason analysis).
Once the plaintiff makes a showing of such an effect, the burden shifts to the
defendant to prove any pro-competitive justifications. See id. (referring to balanc-
ing test required by rule of reason analysis). The court will weigh any procompeti-
tive justifications against any anticompetitive effects in deciding whether an act
should be considered a violation of the antitrust laws. See id. (noting that
factfinders weigh all facts and circumstances before concluding whether act violate
Sherman Act).
134. Id. at 885-86 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)) (citing
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (2006)).
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the busi-
ness to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the rea-
son for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts.
Bd. of Trade of Ch. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918).
[Vol. 18: p. 645
22
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol18/iss2/9
NOT WITH A BANG, BUT A WHIMPER
harmful to the consumer, or whether a practice stimulates competi-
tion and thus benefits the consumer.13 5
Although the general rule is the rule of reason, the Court ac-
knowledged that in particular cases, a per se rule applies.' 3 6 Those
are cases in which the courts have had considerable experience and
know that the behavior in question "always or almost always tend [s]
to restrict competition and decrease output."13 7 When the results
of a particular economic practice are unclear the Court hesitates to
apply the per se rule as there is no way to show such a decision is
anything but purely arbitrary.13 8
Having established its general practices in cases where the eco-
nomic impact of a practice is in question, the Court turned to its
prior precedent on the topic at issue: vertical price fixing in the Dr.
Miles case.139 That case made vertical agreements between a manu-
facturer and a distributor to set minimum resale prices per se ille-
gal.140 The Court noted that this earlier decision was based upon a
common-law rule that banned restraint on "alienation."141 This
common-law rule was based on a treatise published in 1628 which
threw little light on the business practices of substantial companies
135. See id. at 886 (stating "[i]n its design and function the rule distinguishes
between restraints with anti-competitive effect that are harmful to the consumer
and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's best interest").
136. See id. (noting that "[t]he rule of reason does not govern all restraints.
Some types 'are deemed unlawful per se'") (quoting Khan).
137. Id. (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp. 485 U.S. 717, 723
(1988)).
138. See id. at 887 (explaining that "we have expressed reluctance to adopt per
se rules with regard to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships
where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious")
(quoting Khan at 10).
139. See id. at 887 (presenting Dr. Miles). See supra notes 73-89 and ensuing
discussion for further information on Dr. Miles.
140. See Dr. Miles Med. Co., v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408-9
(1911) (holding that vertical price fixing agreements were illegal under Sherman
Act).
141. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887
(2007) (discussing holding in Dr. Miles). "Alienable" property is that to which a
person has the right to exclusive disposal. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1731-34 (explaining concept of alienation). Harris refers
to John Stewart Mill for the more classic understanding of alienation. See JOHN
STEWART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONoMY 224 (Great Mind Series, Prome-
theus Books 2004) (1848):
The institution of property, when limited to its essential elements, con-
sists in the recognition, in each person, of a right to the exclusive disposal
of what he or she have produced by their own exertions, or received ei-
ther by gift or by fair agreement, without force, or fraud, from those who
produced it.
Id.
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in 1911, and much less in 2007.142 The Court did agree that a com-
mon law methodology applies in Sherman Act interpretation, but
cautioned against applying old and often irrelevant doctrine.1 4 3
In Dr. Miles, the Court treated vertical price agreements as per
se illegal, but at the time of its 1911 decision, the Court did not have
a grasp on modern economic analysis.' 44 In particular, Dr. Miles
treated vertical price fixing agreements as having the same eco-
nomic effect as horizontal price fixing agreements, a belief modern
economists fell is incorrect. 14 5 The current belief is that resale
price maintenance may actually promote interbrand competition
and thus benefit consumers in several ways. 4 6
Interbrand competition, the Court noted, is good for the con-
sumer and for that reason should be protected, not barred by anti-
trust laws.14 7 The idea is that price floors allow manufacturers to
remove price competition from the retailer mix and thereby forces
retailers to compete on other grounds (like services) 148 Theoreti-
cally, this stability among retailer prices encourages retailers to re-
sort to more beneficial non-price competition that ultimately
benefits consumers. 149 If a manufacturer eliminates price competi-
142. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 888 (stating that "[t]he Court in Dr. Miles relied on
a treatise published in 1628, but failed to discuss in detail the business reasons that
would motivate a manufacturer situated in 1911 to make use of vertical price
restraints").
143. See id. at 899-900 (discussing how Supreme Court has generally recog-
nized that Sherman Act, although Congressional statute, is distinct from other stat-
utes because at the time of its institution neither Congress nor Court understood
enough economics to properly institute concepts set out by the Act). As a result,
the Court has taken a common law approach to interpreting the statute-setting
forth precedent early on that it later overruled with the dawn of modem economic
analysis. See id. (stating that Sherman Act is common law statute meant to "evolve
to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions").
144. See id. at 888 (noting that Dr Miles decision equated vertical price fixing
with horizontal price fixing without first performing proper analysis).
145. See id. (discussing that "[o]ur recent cases formulate antitrust principles
in accordance with the appreciated differences in economic effect between vertical
and horizontal agreements, differences the Dr Miles Court failed to consider").
146. See id. (citing current economic consensus on vertical price fixing).
147. See id. at 890 (explaining purpose of antitrust laws and dispelling associa-
tion between vertical and horizontal price fixing) (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3 (1997)). Setting the price of one product between retailers, theoretically
allows for greater competition among manufacturers, ultimately benefitting con-
sumers either by pushing prices closer to their marginal cost or by allowing for
manufacturers to furnish clients with better services. See id. at 890-91 (discussing
economic effects of manufacturer vertical price fixing).
148. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890 (explaining how interbrand competition bene-
fits consumers).
149. See id. (setting out mechanics of interbrand and intrabrand competi-
tion). Also, resale price maintenance can increase interbrand competition by low-
ering the barriers to market entry. New manufacturers entering the market can
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tion between retailers with a retail price floor, retailers will instead
compete by offering better or varied services to attract customers
interested in similar products.150 This allows for a greater spectrum
of products on the market and thus means producers meet the
needs of more consumers. 5 1 Further, economists argue that this is
the most economically efficient way for a manufacturer to expand
its market share.152
The Court, of course, recognized that not all vertical price fix-
ing has a pro-competitive effect.' 5 3 Resale price maintenance can
cause a free rider effect, allowing some manufacturers to undercut
their competitors and still benefit from the market-wide service im-
provements. 1 5 4 More disconcerting, vertical price fixing can facili-
tate monopoly profits by encouraging manufacturer cartels to form
that then (after undercutting each other and creating a procompe-
titive effect) could potentially create actual or tacit price-fixing
agreements harmful to consumers.'55 If they were to compel a
manufacturer to aid them in an unlawful price fixing arrangement,
use the price floor to induce retailers to invest in promoting the new brand. See id.
at 891 (pointing out further benefits).
150. See id. at 890-91 (demonstrating non-price incentives retailers use to at-
tract customers). Some examples of services may include superior showrooms,
product demonstrations, or particularly knowledgeable employees. See id. at 891
(giving examples of improved services).
151. See id. (showing how differentiation of products can appeal to a broader
market). For example, one manufacturer can offer a cheaper, low-end product
while another can offer a high-end version accompanied by all sorts of retailer
services. See id. (giving examples of varied retailer services). The first consumer
benefits because she is able to afford an otherwise unattainable product; the sec-
ond consumer gleans status, peace of mind or perhaps inclusive repairs or other
services for their increased expenditure. See id. (presenting different benefits con-
sumer receives from producers competing on variety of price and non-price prod-
uct elements).
152. See id. at 892.
[I]t may be difficult and inefficient for a manufacturer to make and en-
force a contract with a retailer specifying the different services the retailer
must perform. Offering the retailer a guaranteed margin and threaten-
ing termination if it does not live up to expectations may be the most
efficient way to expand the manufacturer's market share ....
Id.
153. See id. (admitting setting minimum prices can have anti-competitive ef-
fects in some cases).
154. See id. at 891 (describing free rider effect). Nevertheless, free riding can
still occur absent minimum RPM. See id. (discussing how free riding can manifest
itself in product market). Also, minimum RPM is aimed at combating free riding
at the retail level. See id. (stating "[m]inimum resale price maintenance alleviates
the problem because it prevents the discounter from undercutting the service
provider.").
155. See id. at 892 (explaining possible monopoly effects of vertical price
maintenance). In US. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. the court held that naked price-
fixing agreements were illegal per se under the Sherman Act and that the court
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retailers could also use the price floors to create cartels.' 5 6 In all
these unfortunate instances, retailers and manufacturers would es-
sentially be using vertical price maintenance as a means of institut-
ing horizontal price fixing, a practice that the Supreme Court
maintains is per se illegal under Socony.15 7
Even though the Court recognized that vertical price mainte-
nance could present opportunities for abuse and have anti-competi-
tive effects, the Court also noted that the behavior could also
ultimately benefit the consumer.'58 Because vertical price fixing
could be pro-competitive, the Court refused to label vertical price
maintenance as per se illegal.15 9 The Court also emphasized that per
se illegality was not to be the "rule" in antitrust law.16 0 Instead, the
rule of reason is the default rule in antitrust cases, unless a showing
that the challenged practice is known from experience to be always,
or almost always anticompetitive.161
Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the Court pointed
out that for manufacturers, there is no incentive to needlessly in-
flate product prices because the retailers, not the manufacturers,
would benefit.162 Further, a simple increase in prices should not
automatically lead one to believe a manufacturer is engaging in
anti-competitive activity.16 3  Analyzing market impact, the Court
would not entertain any pro-competitive justifications for such acts. See 310 U.S.
150, 218 (1940).
Agreements for price maintenance of articles moving in interstate com-
merce are, without more, unreasonable restraints within the meaning of
the Sherman Act because they eliminate competition ... and agreements
which create potential power for such price maintenance exhibited by its
actual exertion for that purpose are in themselves unlawful restraints
within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
Id.
156. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893 (stating how manufacturers would not get any
increased service as all profit would go to retailer cartels).
157. See id. at 893 (citing Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006)) (stating
legal consensus on horizontal price fixing).
158. See id. (hesitating to label price maintenance as per se anti-competitive).
159. See id. at 894-95 (arguing per se rule cannot apply when there are pro-
competitive possibilities).
160. See id. (showing argument that per se illegality has administrative advan-
tages suggests per se illegality is the rule not the exception-an inaccurate reading
of antitrust law).
161. See id. at 898 (promoting rule of reason as proper standard).
162. See id at 896 ("A manufacturer has no incentive to overcompensate re-
tailers with unjustified margins. The retailers, not the manufacturer, gain from
higher retail prices. The manufacturer often loses; interbrand competition
reduces its competitiveness and market share because consumer will 'substitute a
different brand of the same product.'")
163. See id. at 896-97 (looking at facts of case and analyzing what would
amount to anti-competitive behavior). The Court gave the example of price in-
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noted that a single manufacturer setting a price floor in a competi-
tive market would cause some consumers to purchase a cheaper
equivalent product, thus diverting any gains from price increase to
other manufacturers.1 64 Generally, the Court found that unless a
player had significant market power, setting a vertical price mini-
mum was unlikely to have an anti-competitive effect on the
market.165
Having considered the issue of vertical price floors as an origi-
nal issue, the Court had to decide whether to keep the Dr. Miles
precedent. 16 6 The Court held that despite being a century-old pre-
cedent, Dr. Miles could still be overturned.' 67 First, the Court had
treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute, which gave the
Court authority to set the law in this instance.' 68 Second, the Court
said stare decisis does not require adherence to incorrect prece-
dent.169 Finally, the Court noted that other recent Supreme Court
decisions had limited the Dr. Miles decision, essentially allowing
manufacturers to set minimum resale prices in other ways.170
As a last step, the Court looked at statutory precedent that may
have stood in conflict to a judicial decision allowing vertical maxi-
mum price agreements.' 7 ' The Court looked closely at the Con-
sumer Goods Pricing Act, which PSKS claimed codified the rule set
forth in Dr. Miles.172 Ultimately, the Court found this not to be the
case, stating that the rule of reason did not conflict with the Act as
creases from advertising or improved product quality and equated these changes
with better retailer services. Id.
164. See id. at 897 (commenting on price maintenance amongst small number
of players and likelihood of abuse).
165. See id. at 898 (analyzing facts to calculate market impact).
166. See id. at 899 (noting Dr. Miles's long-standing precedent).
167. See id. at 907 (overruling Dr. Miles).
168. See id. at 899("From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman
Act as a common-law statute.") (referencing National Soc. Of Professional Engineers v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688).
169. See id. at 900 ("[R]espected authorities in the economics literature sug-
gest the per se rule is inappropriate, and there is now widespread agreement that
resale price maintenance can have precompetitive effects.") (citation omitted).
170. See id. at 900-01 ("[W]e have overruled our precedents when subsequent
cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings.") (citation omitted).
171. See id. at 904-05 (summarizing congressional action regarding vertical
price restraints).
172. See id. at 905 (explaining content of Consumer Goods Pricing Act). The
Consumer Goods Pricing Act repealed the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act and the
McGuire Act. See Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (making verti-
cal price restraints legal if allowed under fair trade law). See McGuire Act, 66 Stat.
632 (1975) (allowing vertical price-fixing agreements between manufacturers and
distributors to be enforced against distributors not involved in the agreement). See
Consumer Goods Pricing Act, Publ. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
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the Act itself did not consider vertical price restraints as per se ille-
gal.173 Congress created the legislation so states could protect small
retailers from large discounters, thus protecting more vulnerable
businesses.17 4 The Court was careful to point out that the Sherman
Act, unlike other legislation, was designed to protect competition
and not competitors themselves. 75 Having established that it was
not bound under any theory to follow Dr. Miles, the Court over-
turned the decision and held that vertical price restraints from that
point on were to be judged using a rule of reason analysis.' 76
PART IV: THE DISCOUNT PRICING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
Four months after the Supreme Court's decision in Leegin, Sen-
ator Herb Kohl introduced a bill to the Senate Judiciary proposing
to enact legislation overriding the Supreme Court's decision. 77
Specifically, the bill proposed that Congress amend section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act by adding a statutory per se ban on minimum
RPM.' 78 The idea was to rewind antitrust law back to its pre-Leegin
173. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 905 ("Unlike the earlier congressional exemption,
it does not treat vertical price restraints as per se illegal.").
174. See id. at 905-906 (stating goals of Consumer Goods Pricing Act).
175. See id. at 906 ("The purpose of the antitrust laws ... is 'the protection of
competition, not competitors.'").
176. See id. at 907 (holding Dr. Miles no longer valid and rule of reason analy-
sis to be standard).
177. See Kohl Introduces Measure to Restore Per Se Illegality Rule for Minimum RPM,
93 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., 561 (Nov. 2, 2007) (reporting that Senator Kohl
introduced bill to overturn Leegin on October 30, 2007). Senators Hillary Clinton,
Joe Biden and Sheldon Whitehouse cosponsored the bill when it was introduced.
S. 2261, 110th Cong. (2007). PamelaJones Harbour, former commissioner of the
Federal Trade Commission, contradicted the FTC's position on RPM agreements
and put her support behind Senator Kohl. See Pamela Jones Harbour - Partner, FuL-
BRIGHT & JAWoRSli L.L.P., http://www.fulbright.com/pharbour (last visited Mar.
10, 2011). See Pamela Jones Harbour, An Open Letter to the Supreme Court of the
United States from Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/070226verticalminimum
pricefixing.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2011) (asking Supreme Court to declare mini-
mum RPM agreements per se illegal). Ms. Harbour also wrote a paper arguing to
reinstate the RPM ban and gave testimony before the Supreme Court during the
Leegin deliberations and before the Senate Judiciary Committee while it deliber-
ated Senator Kohl's bill. See id. (noting desire to reinstate RPM ban); PamelaJones
Harbour, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy
and Consumer Rights (July 31, 2010) (testifying before Subcommitee); Pamela
Jones Harbour, A Tale of Two Marks, and Other Antitrust Concerns, 20 Loyola Con-
sumer L. Rev. 32 (2008) (arguing Court decided wrongly in Leegin).
178. The bill proposed that Congress add the following after the first sen-
tence of section 1 of the Sherman Act: "Any contract, combination, conspiracy or
agreement setting a minimum price below which a product or service cannot be
sold by a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor shall violate this Act." S. 148 § 3, 111th
Cong. (2009).
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state.' 79 If passed into law, the bill would eclipse the Leegin deci-
sion, and could potentially result in an even broader ban than what
was in effect under Dr. Miles.180
Senator Kohl champions the bill as the protector of consumer
access to discount products.' 8 ' He claims that absent congressional
action, consumers will suffer from uniform high prices and see the
end of discount pricing options.182 Further, Kohl claims that busi-
nesses, especially small discount businesses, will suffer because
Leegin makes it impossible for companies to compete on price when
RPM agreements are in effect.183
179. See S. 148, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating that purpose of bill was to "re-
store" ban on RPM agreements). See Press Release, Senator Herb Kohl, Kohl Ex-
amines the Legality of Manufacturers Barring Discount Prices (May 19, 2010),
available at http://kohl.senate.gov/newsroom/pressrelease.cfm?customel-data
PageID_1464=2696 (last visited Mar. 10, 2011) (announcing that Senator Kohl's
goal is to set law back to its pre-Leegin state).
180. Because the "contract, combination, conspiracy, or agreement" language
is almost identical to the beginning of section 1, it is likely that the court will have
to apply higher scrutiny to the relationships between manufacturers and retailers
than it did under Dr. Miles. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) ("Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
... is declared to be illegal."); S. 148, 111th Cong. (2009) ("Any contract, combina-
tion, conspiracy or agreement setting a minimum price below which a product or
service cannot be sold by a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor shall violate this
Act."). This means that under this new amendment, options like the Colgate doc-
trine or perhaps other exceptions to an RPM ban may not apply. See Silberman,
supra note 63, at 575 (explaining how to apply Colgate and explaining its impor-
tance in states who have passed laws banning minimum RPM agreements post
Leegin).
181. See Press Release, Senator Herb Kohl, Kohl Examines the Legality of
Manufacturers Barring Discount Prices, (May 19, 2010), available at http://kohl.
senate.gov/newsroom/pressrelease.cfm?customel-dataPageID_1464=2696 (last vis-
ited Mar. 10, 2011) ("Kohl introduced the 'Discount Pricing Consumer Protection
Act' to ensure that consumers will be able to continue discount shopping despite
the Supreme Court's decision to overturn the ban on vertical price fixing.") [Here-
inafter May 19, 2009 Kohl Statement]; see The Discount Pricing Consumer Protec-
tion Act: Hearing on S. 138 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong.
(2009) (statement of the Honorable Herb Kohl), available at http://www.vote
smart.org/speech-detail.php?scid=462996 (declaring evils of manufacturers al-
lowed to set minimum RPM agreements and end of discount product era) [herein-
after Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act].
182. See May 19, 2009 Kohl Statement, supra note 181 ("The Court's decision
in . . . Leegin . . . allows manufacturers to set a minimum price below which a
retailer cannot sell the manufacturer's product, threatening the existence of dis-
counting and discount stores and leading to higher prices for consumers.").
183. See The Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, supra note 181 (stat-
ing established retailers will take advantage of vertical price fixing and push
smaller retailers out of business by forcing manufacturers to create such agree-
ments). If retailers were to force manufacturers to fix prices for the purpose or
with the effect of pushing smaller retailers out of business, the act would indepen-
dently violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. See E. States Retail Lumber Dealers'
Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914).
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While all these arguments may be appealing to the public, who
hears that the last thing consumers need in hard economic times
are fewer discount options, Senator Kohl's statements do not ex-
actly line up with reality.' 8 4 First, the popular media has grossly
misinterpreted the Leegin decision, putting forth the notion that
RPM agreements are now always legal.185 This is unfortunate, be-
cause the Court was very careful to specify that rule of reason analy-
sis is not a license for manufacturers to freely make RPM
agreements.18 6  If challenged with anticompetitive accusations,
manufacturers setting RPM agreements must still show that such
agreements have a pro-competitive effect.'8 7 Thus, manufacturers
are likely to be very cautious before setting such agreements. 8 8
When the retailer goes beyond his personal right, and, conspiring and
combining with others of like purpose, seeks to obstruct the free course
of interstate trade and commerce and to unduly suppress competition ...
he exceeds his lawful rights, and such action brings him and those acting
with him within the condemnation of the act of Congress ...
Id.
184. See May 19, 2009 Kohl Statement, supra note 181.
Our experience since the Leegin decision is giving credence to [fears that
minimum RPM agreements would threaten discount shopping], and it
comes at exactly the wrong time-just as millions of consumer [sic] face a
serious recession and depend on bargain shopping more than ever to
balance the family budget. That is why I have introduced legislation to
overturn this misguided Supreme Court ruling.
Id.
185. See Himowitz, supra note 5 at 7D (forecasting all electronics companies
will institute vertical price agreements and uniformly raise consumer prices); Per-
eira, supra note 1, at Al (giving mainly one-sided account of possible negative ef-
fects of minimum RPM agreements); Steve Chapman, Leave it to the Invisible Hand,
BALT. SUN, Apr. 2, 2007, at 11A (declaring Court's Leegin decision places stricter
rules on businesses); Robert Barnes, Handbag Case May Hit Pocketbooks, CHARLOTrE
OBSERVER, Mar. 27, 2007, at ID (depicting Dr. Miles as patron saint of shoppers
because allowed for more discounted products).
186. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 892-94
(stating regardless of any permission to set minimum prices, anticompetitive be-
havior without any more powerful procompetitive effect remains illegal under the
Sherman Act).
187. See Beth L. Fancsali& Paul Olszowka, How Wide Did the Supreme Court Open
the Door to Minimum Resale Pricing?, 15 ANDREws LITIG. REP., Sept. 2007, at 1, 4
(explaining manufacturer must still be able to show setting a minimum resale
price will benefit consumers to avoid liability under the antitrust laws).
188. See id. (advising "companies and their counsel should proceed cau-
tiously, carefully consider the purpose of the arrangements, and document the
specific benefits to consumers and interbrand competition of any program they
implement"); Jen Haberkorn, Law Urged Against Price Floors, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 1,
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 14836652 (quoting Janet L. McDavid, antitrust law-
yer at Hogan & Hartson in D.C.) ("Companies aren't jumping at the opportunity
[to fix prices]. They're thinking very carefully about how any action they take
would be subject to the 'rule of reason.'").
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Therefore, manufacturers will unlikely start increasing prices
uniformly.189
Senator Kohl is correct that consumers may see higher prices
on certain products.190 Nevertheless, this hardly spells the doom of
discount pricing as not all manufacturers of a particular type of
product are likely to set across-the-board minimum prices.191 First,
if one manufacturer decides to set a minimum resale price, con-
sumers who are not interested in paying higher set price will be
likely to divert their business to another manufacturer's brand of
that product. 192 Second, consumers that remain loyal to the prod-
uct will then get something extra for the added cost. 193 In addition,
the products that may see increased prices will likely be branded
products-things that are nice to have, but not necessary. 194
189. A group of manufacturers, with market power, could not band together
and uniformly raise the price on a product without violating the Sherman Act. See
BORK, supra note 23, at 101-04 (spelling out what constitutes oligopoly behavior,
practices illegal under section 1 of Sherman Act).
190. The whole point of setting RPM agreements is to prevent retailers from
lowering prices, so any product that falls under such an agreement will naturally
be more expensive. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480) (statement of
Justice Scalia), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argu-
ment-transcripts.aspx (noting consumer welfare does not always translate to lower
prices and that purpose of minimum RPM is to prevent discounting).
191. In order to kill discount pricing, manufacturers of similar products
would have to make agreements among themselves to set prices, eliminating any
market incentive for competition. This would qualify as a horizontal price-fixing
agreement and would be per se illegal under the Sherman Act. See POSNER, supra
note 41 at 159 (explaining that price-fixing agreements are per se illegal). Note
that such an agreement would only be possible in a market with concentrated
power in only a few manufacturers-getting a large number of manufacturers to
agree to such an arrangement would be near impossible. See Bork, supra note 23,
at 101-04 (explaining oligopolistic market and the incentive for members to
"cheat"). Further, if a number of manufacturers did succeed in formulating such a
conspiracy by setting uniform vertical agreements, the temptation for one or more
manufacturers to undercut the others and reap extra profits would probably be
too much and end up collapsing or at least revealing the plot. See id. at 104
("[T]here will always be a temptation to 'cheat,' to pick up a very profitable piece
of extra business with a small price cut.").
192. See Law of Demand, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
l/lawofdemand.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2011) (stating as price of goods or services
increases, consumer demand decreases).
193. Added product cost can mean consumers get more services accompany-
ing the base product. See Orbach, supra note 30, at 273 (explaining possible bene-
fits for consumers of higher prices). For example, consumers may get added
repairs, point of sales services or improved customer support. See id. at 273 (dis-
cussing relationship between added cost and increase in services). Increased price
can also amount to a luxury premium-a signal of product quality or associated
status. See id. at 282 (stating consumers are sometimes willing to pay more to have
image benefits of particular brand).
194. See Orbach, supra note 30, at 6 (showing how RPM first emerged to pro-
tect product branding). Making it harder for manufacturers to distinguish their
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Also of note is that antitrust arguments are economic in na-
ture, not popular.195 Oftentimes consumer welfare translates as
lower prices, but this is not always the case.196 Consumers can ben-
efit from more than just price reductions, and in some cases, those
added benefits outweigh a lower price. 197 In this case, if a manufac-
turer decides to set prices to heighten its brand image or add ser-
vices, customers may be convinced that the price hike is warranted;
otherwise, the manufacturer may push itself out of business.' 98
Senator Kohl argues that RPM agreements also hurt small busi-
nesses, making it hard for them to compete on the basis of price.199
In actuality, large internet discounters are positively harmed when a
manufacturer sets minimum resale prices because they lose their
competitive advantage over other sellers-low prices in lieu of
point of sales services among other things. 200 Usually, these busi-
nesses can sell products at a deep discount because they do not
have the same costs as non-internet sellers-like small businesses.201
A non-discounting store would presumably provide the consumer
products in the market makes a statement (perhaps unknowingly) on consumers'
right to pursue status by eliminating those distinctions. See id. at 21 ("[A]ssuming
Congress ever wishes to address the pursuit of status, a ban on RPM that intends to
promote a brand image is unlikely to alter preferences for luxury or to reduce the
quantities or prices of status goods on the market.").
195. See generally BomK supra note 23 (arguing antitrust does not follow same
public policy pursuits as rest of legal world; antitrust is an economic pursuit for
efficiency).
196. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480), available at http://www.su-
premecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument-transcripts.aspx (asserting while
lower prices can benefit consumer welfare, other product qualities may outweigh
allure of lower prices for consumers).
197. See Orbach, supra note 30, at 8-12 (presenting non-price-based motives
consumers may have for purchasing product).
198. See Cole & McDonald, supra note 4, at 3 (noting most manufacturers
cannot afford to raise prices because they will lose too many customers).
199. See May 19, 2009 Kohl Statement, supra note 181 (stating large retailers
can push smaller retailers out of market by forcing manufacturer to establish mini-
mum RPM agreements).
200. See Erich M. Fabricius, Comment, The Death of Discount Online Retailing?
Resale Price Maintenance After Leegin v. PSKS, 9 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 87, 106 (2007)
(concluding retailers competing solely on price, including online retailers, could
be disadvantaged by minimum RPM agreements); see also Cole & McDonald, supra
note 4, at 4 (recognizing minimum RPM agreements on some products could
foreclose discount retailers, or specifically online retailers).
201. See Michael Diamond, We All Add to Cost-Cutting Measures, PosT-CRESCENT,
Apr. 10, 2008, at CO, available at 2008 WLNR 26876596 (emphasizing internet
sellers cut costs by providing customers fewer services). Ebay, a supporter of Sena-
tor Kohl's bill, is notorious for its poor customer service. See About Halfof eBay Users
Reported Dealing With Deception, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, July 5, 2007, available at 2007
WLNR 12991252 (reporting forty percent of eBay customers rate its customer ser-
vice as poor); see Brian Dipert, Cyber-Sleaze, EDN COMMENT, Apr. 17, 2003, available
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with better services-services a manufacturer would want the con-
sumer to associate with its product.202 Discounters free ride on re-
tailers that provide services, which is a problem when considering
whether retailers can continue to afford such services.203 Usually,
small businesses are the retailers providing services, they are not
providing the deep discounts that larger internet sellers are more
equipped to provide.204
Proponents of the bill have also argued that allowing RPM
agreements has already had a negative effect on prices. 205 In partic-
ular, proponents cite the increased number of complaints alleging
abuse as indicative that manufacturers are behaving badly. 206 This
negative price effect also does not necessarily prove that minimum
RPM agreements are always or almost always anticompetitive. 207
Because Leegin is new law, it is normal that the courts see an influx
of new cases, as everyone is unsure of how rule of reason applies to
such agreements. 208 The number of cases will probably decrease as
the circuits determine how to handle the new law. 209
One must remember that when manufacturers set minimum
resale prices it does not necessarily mean that manufacturers make
at 2003 WLNR 17091340 (attributing eBay's high earnings to its deficiencies in
customer service and corporate responsibility).
202. See Brief of PING, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9-15,
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-
480), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-conversation/pdf/Leegin
PINGAmicus.pdf (justifying golfing goods company PING's minimum RPM
agreements by saying minimum prices allow PING to provide its customers with
superior services and distinguish its brand in competitive market).
203. See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis
of Antitrust Principles and Their Application 1631c (3d ed., 2006) (discussing
economic effects of free-riding).
204. See Fabricius, supra note 200, at 109 (distinguishing large discounters like
Wal-Mart from more common smaller retailer that would benefit from minimum
RPM agreement).
205. See May 19, 2009 Kohl Statement, supra note 181 ("We have already be-
gun to see manufacturers set minimum retail prices resulting in higher prices for
consumers."). Senator Kohl also cited an eighteen to twenty-seven percent higher
price margin in fair trade law states in 2007. See to Restore Per Se Illegality Rule for
Minimum RPM, supra note 177 (discussing fair trade law states).
206. See Newsroom Senator Kohl, supra note 6 (claiming small and large re-
tailers across the country have been suffering from manufacturers putting bans on
discounting).
207. See Cole & McDonald, supra note 4, at 4 (detailing requirements for per se
illegal standard in antitrust cases).
208. See Fancsali & Olszowka, supra note 187, at 1, 5 ("[M]any believe that
there will be more litigation-not less-in the short term while courts sort out the
contours of the rule-of-reason analysis.").
209. See id. (examining whether manufacturers will start adopting minimum
RPM agreements on large scale following Leegin and whether those agreements
risk being abusive).
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more direct profits. 2 10 Retailers get the increased revenue, not
manufacturers. 211 At least initially, manufacturers may not see an
increase in revenue as the added margin for retailers is competed
away in some form (i.e. advertising or point of sales services).212
Thus, unless there is some sort of retailer-manufacturer collusion to
fix prices whereby a band of retailers force manufacturers to set a
minimum price, manufacturer will be unlikely to act outside the
consumer's interest.213
PART V: THE MUSIC INDUSTRY
By overturning the Leegin decision the Discount Pricing Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2009 could potentially harm consumers in
the music industry.214 Large record labels, retail chains and online
digitized music vendors are the main controllers in the music indus-
try.2 15 Because of the nature of the business, these sellers try to
create a product that targets the largest possible audience (pop mu-
sic) and using the lowest cost possible, relying on the sheer mass of
sales to turn a profit.216 This model works for artists who create
210. SeeJulie M. Olszweski, Comment, Overruling a Nearly Century-Old Precedent:
Why Leegin Got it Right, 94 IowA L. R. 375, 400 (2008) (presenting idea that mini-
mum restraints could encourage manufacturers to enter market by using extra
price margin to persuade retailers to carry its products)
211. See id. (showing minimum pricing could also entice new retailers to in-
vest in new market because of padded profits they can receive).
212. See id. (noting that increase in price does not lead to higher manufac-
turer profits per unit of product sold).
213. See Orbach, supra note 30, at 267-77 (presenting different theories on
whether minimum RPM agreements have a negative effect on consumer welfare).
214. See Christman I, supra note 12 at 14 (arguing that setting minimum RPM
could benefit small artists). See S. 148 § 3, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing lan-
guage be added to Sherman Act to overturn Supreme Court's decision in Leegin).
215. See Dominating the Music Industry, BBC WORLD SERVICE, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/worldservice/specials/1042_globalmusic/page3.shtml (last visited Mar. 9,
2011) (noting ninety percent of global music market concentrated in five large
labels). See Chris Foresman, Music Industry Still Not Thrilled With iTunes Control, ARS
TECHNICA.COM (Feb. 2, 2009, 3:16PM) http://arstechnica.com/apple/news/2009/
02/music-industry-still-not-thrilled-with-itunes-control.ars (discussing how apple
has been gradually gaining control of music markets). See Tiago Moura, Wal-Mart's
CD Markdowns Wory Music Industry, PASETMAGAZINE.COM, (Mar. 5, 2008, 10:55AM)
(reporting on Wal-Mart's increase control of album prices).
216. See Diane Rapaport, How Record Companies Make Money, BMusIc.coM.AU,
http://www.bmusic.com.au/links/industry/archives/ararchiv/reccomp.html (last
visited Mar. 9, 2011) (explaining how record companies make profit on CDs). Be-
cause of the lower cost and lower transactions costs associate with digitized music
options, record labels have had a hard time making the large profits they used to
on CD sales. See Album Sales Plunge, supra note 19 (noting how digital sales are
rapidly taking over CD sales); Peter Tschmuck, The Recession in the Music Industry -
A Cause Analysis, Music Bus. RESEARCH (Mar. 29, 2010) (looking at the historical
progression of music industry and noting that record labels concentrate on con-
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albums that prompt short-lived boom sales, but does not work well
for more particularized music markets (i.e. classical or jazz
music).217
By setting a minimum price for particularized artists' music,
record labels could help fund those artists.218 Labels have difficulty
sponsoring new musicians specializing in these genres because they
must suppress their prices to compete with the pop album prices set
by large retailers and low-cost download sellers. 219 While normally
competing sellers outside the market is good for the consumer, cre-
ating lower prices or superior services, here there is a negative ef-
fect, restricting variety within the market.220
In the case ofjazz and classical music, the particular interpreta-
tion of a piece of music or the recording quality can make all the
difference. 221 Classical music, which often requires a large number
of musicians for any given piece, the fixed production costs greatly
exceed that of any garage musician or even any pop singer.222
These fixed costs automatically limit the number of albums on the
market, which is not necessarily a negative.223 The problem arises
centrated big hits markets rather than vast array of smaller specialized music
markets).
217. See Leon Botstein, The Unsung Success of Live Classical Music, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 3, 2008, at W1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12229910320 7 60
0279.html?mod=special-page-campaign2008_mostpop (discussing particular na-
ture of classical music and need for different approach to its propagation than that
employed by mainstream musicians).
218. See Christman I, supra note 12, at 14 (discussing possible positive effects
of music industry setting minimum RMPs).
219. See Botstein, supra note 217, at W1 (noting now-broad availability of low
cost classical music albums because of comparably low music prices but also re-
marking that market attracts different type of audience than that of mainstream
pop).
220. See Kostas Axarloglou, New Products Market Competition, 10 Ir'L ADVANCES
IN ECON. RESEARCH 226 (2004) (finding increased variety in product markets in-
creases competition and decreases overall prices).
221. See Botstein, supra note 217, at W1 (exploring different means of en-
joying classical music).
222. See Kyle Macmillan, Hanging by a String.- Classical Music Hits Hard Times,
DENVER PosT (Dec. 19, 2010) (explaining high fixed costs inherent in classical
music industry). Aside from the increased cost of paying multiple musicians
(which may or may not have an impact on the fixed costs when one takes the large
salary of pop musicians into account), classical music also requires specialized re-
cording equipment and much larger recording venues, which contribute to both
the increased actual and transaction costs of producing such music. See Bruce
Bartlett, Stereo Recording Procedures, DELTAMEDIA.cOM, http://www.deltamedia.
com/resource/stereo-recording-procedures.html, (last visited Mar. 8, 2011) (de-
tailing procedure for classical music recording).
223. See Does Classical Music Have a Place in the Rapidly Evolving Digital Recorded
Music Sales Sector?, Music & COPYRIGHT'S BLOG (Jan. 4, 2010, 11:26AM), http://
musicandcopyright.wordpress.com/2010/01/04/does-classical-music-have-a-place-
6792011]
35
Gillies: Not with a Bang, but a Whimper: Congress's Proposal to Overturn t
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
680 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 18: p. 645
when classical music albums must compete with the lower fixed
costs and volatile sales of pop albums. 224 Because retailers price
normally non-competing genres of music against each other, they
exclude some artist from the market by incorrectly calculating price
ratios.225
A solution to this problem could be for labels to create mini-
mum resale prices within particularized music markets. 2 26 This
would allow those markets with high demand but lower than appro-
priate selection to expand, creating a broader array of choices for
the consumer within a particular music genre. 227 Labels would be
able not only to better support these particularized markets as they
stand, but would also be able to subsidize new artists and projects
within those markets.2 2 8 In the CD retail market, this would mean
better support for small, specialized music dealers who could then
promote particular artists; in the digital market, RPM would subsi-
dize the benefits that the consumer would get from a broader digi-
tized market (increasingly broad digital library, online album
promotion, vendor recommendations etc.)"229 Further, consumers
and retailers would both get the benefit of capturing a "long-tail"
market with these particularized musical areas.230
in-the-rapidly-evolving-digital-recorded-music-sales-sector/ (mentioning high fixed
costs of classical music production that bar many smaller labels from taking on
classical music projects).
224. See id. (commenting on higher production costs of classical music re-
cordings). See Diane Rapaport, How Record Companies Make Money, BMUSIC.COM.AU,
http://www.bmusic.com.au/links/industry/archives/ararchiv/reccomp.html (last
visited Mar. 9, 2011) (noting baseline average production costs for single record-
ing artist and noting significantly lowered costs for garage band artists).
225. See Tschmuck, supra note 216 (noting record companies try to restrict
selection so as to create larger grossing individual artists rather than array of small,
individualized markets).
226. See Christman I, supra note 12, at 14 (presenting possible positive effects
of particularized music markets setting minimum RPMs).
227. See Does Classical Music Have a Place in the Rapidly Evolving Digital Recorded
Music Sales Sector?, Music & CoPYRIGHTr's BLOG (Jan. 4, 2010, 11:26AM), http://
musicandcopyright.wordpress.com/2010/01/04/does-classical-music-have-a-place-
in-the-rapidly-evolving-digital-recorded-music-sales-sector/ (noting only "low-mar-
gin, core classical music" is widely available in market despite existence of classical
music market). See Botstein, supra note 217, at W1 (illustrating vibrancy and inter-
est of classical music market despite claims of reduced interest in genre).
228. See Christman I, supra note 12, at 14 (outlining how particularized music
market sellers could apply the funds they would receive from instituting minimum
RPMs to improving market selection).
229. See id. (noting possible distribution options and effects on consumer ser-
vices in particularized music markets).
230. See Chris Anderson, The Long Tail WIRED (Oct. 2004) http://www.wired.
com/wired/archive/12.10/tail.html (explaining the "long-tail" market theory).
Long-tail is a statistical theory that posits that a larger share of the population lies
in the tail of a probability distribution than observed under a normal population
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NOT WITH A BANG, BUT A WHIMPER
PART VI: CONCLUSION
The Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act was on the
Senate Legislative Calendar and was reported by committee in the
House and awaited Congressional decision at the end of 2010.231
Although the bill has appeared to be yet another bill set to pass with
little attention from the press or the public, the recent change in
Congressional representation seems to have put the legislation on
hold.232
Dr. Miles was the norm for many years, but that does not make
the holding good precedent nor any less disappointing that Con-
gress is proposing a bill so clearly adverse to the common con-
sumer's interests. 233 The US legal system has already been
systematically restricting big business, pushing possible economic
growth out of the United States. 234 Leegin has been a breath of
fresh air for some businesses-another element that made doing
business in the United States more attractive.235 Luckily, at least for
now, the Leegin decision is set to remain intact and we can finally
see how these new economic options for businesses will play out.2 3 6
distribution. See id. (describing long-tail theory). The implication is that while
there may be one larger market where a pool of people participate, the aggregate
of smaller markets actually amounts to more than the total big market. See id.
(looking at specific small markets and how they can be swept up). By appealing to
the small markets and using modern technology (i.e. amazon or itunes suggestion
tools), the larger pool of diversified consumers benefits. See id. (giving example of
book that gained mass popularity years after its publication because of using
smaller market channels).
231. See S. 148, 111th Cong. (2009) (awaiting vote by entire senate); H.R.
3190, 111th Cong. (2009) (acting as parallel legislation to house bill, ordered to be
reported by voice vote). More information on the bill is available at http://
thomas.loc.gov.
232. See Richard Simon, Hundreds of Bills on the Back Burner 'Scramble' to Finish
Lowering Volume on TV Ads a Front-Runner, SEATrLE TIMEs, Oct. 19, 2010, at A4
(painting picture of all bills presented to Congress each year, and practice of om-
nibus bundling representatives engage in to pass legislation).
233. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899-901
(2007) (asserting long-standing precedent does not necessarily mean good or cor-
rect precedent).
234. See Howard H. Chang & David S. Evans, Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?,
REG. 48, 49 (2008), available at www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n4/v30n4-5.
pdf (stating increasing restrictions on business through judicial and prosecutorial
systems is reducing valuable risk-taking behavior in business and pushing entrepre-
neurs into foreign markets).
235. See Cole & McDonald, supra note 4, at 5 (stating net result of Supreme
Court cases over last decade shows strong favoritism toward business).
236. See S. 148: Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, GovTRACK.us, http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=slll-148. (last visited Mar. 9, 2011) (fol-
lowing progression of Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2009 and stat-
ing that bill was never enacted into law and that bills on books over two years are
removed from books).
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Since Senator Kohl is ever dedicated to overturning Leegin this may
not be the last we see of this issue.237
Ariana E. Gillies*
237. One of Senator Kohl's bylines for the bill is that "in these economic
times" consumers cannot be deprived of discount shopping. See May 19, 2009 Kohl
Statement, supra note 181 (explaining Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act
"comes just at the wrong time"). The question is: does that mean Congress would
remove the provision in an economic upturn? It is unlikely given the sell points to
the public on the bill. The political repercussions for a representative to propose
removing a provision that supposedly protects every man's right to a cheaper digi-
tal camera would certainly be less than favorable. See James Madison, Federalist
No. 10, available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federal0.htm (last visited
Feb. 9, 2011) (discussing dangers of faction and how Constitution aims to create
federal government that can prevent any one passion from overpowering legisla-
ture). Our bicameral system is meant to prevent the legislature from making sud-
den, rash decisions thus not only making it difficult to pass laws, but also difficult
to repeal. See id.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
Id.
* J.D. candidate May 2012, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. May 2006,
Barnard College.
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